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Abstract
This report is in three parts. The first part describes a fictitious
case study in which a coalition of forces is brought together to suppress
a guerrilla threat. These forces form a System of Systems sharing data
to improve the efficiency and safety of the operation. Four scenarios
are described within this study, in each we present a dependability
goal and show a policy that acts on realistic metadata to maintain
that goal where possible.
The second part presents a set of five desirable properties of lan-
guages used to write policies. These properties, if found, can help to
manage the complexity of a policy and also assist with showing it is
correct to its specification and does not contain inconsistencies. We
also present a set of properties that should be explicitly considered
when designing a policy and the system that supports it at run-time.
The final part illustrates one possible system that could implement
the behaviour described in the earlier case study. The architecture and
supporting text is intended to illustrate the interactions within the
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system and the functions of the components it contains that together
allow the configuration of the System of Systems to be managed. A key
feature of this framework is that it separates the policies into focussed
parts intended to both reduce the complexity of policy description and
to facilitate policy reuse across platforms.
1 Introduction
Metadata is data describing functional and non-functional properties of
components, as distinct from the data used by components in the course of
their normal operation[1]. A policy describes principles or strategies for a
plan of action designed to achieve a particular set of goals[2]. Resilience is
the ability of a system to maintain dependability while assimilating change
without loss of functionality.
This report begins (Section 2) by presenting a case study that will be
used as an exemplar for the following work. We describe the case study
using MoDAF [3] views (where required) before illustrating how metadata
and policies could be used to govern the configuration of the system in four
distinct scenarios. Each of the scenarios covers a different aspect of the
configuration: the topology of the system; the message passing choreography;
the state of the components and the nature of the connectors between them.
The policies in this section are presented using two languages, PDL (Policy
Description Language) and T-R (Teleo-Reactive programming).
Section 3 presents a set of properties that are desirable for both the
language used to describe a policy and the systems that support the policy.
The language properties are not related to the expressiveness of the policies
that may be produced but could aid the engineering of them, by reducing
complexity and allowing for analysis and checking of correctness against a
specification. The system considerations describe characteristic choices that
surround the policies, for example when the value of metadata is read in
comparison to when a policy rule using it is evaluated.
Finally in Section 4 we give an an overview, in MoDAF terms where
possible, of the reconfiguration framework we will develop to demonstrate
the approach. The description is in two parts. First we describe the assumed
context surrounding an instance of the framework. This context takes the
form of the unit whose configuration we are managing, the operator of the
unit and the other members of the agile mission group. At the same time we
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show that that the framework itself consists of three components:
External framework: manages the System of Systems configuration;
Internal framework: manages the software configuration within the unit;
and
Architecture models: models shared between the internal and external
framework to represent this units view of the system.
As the focus of this work is the System of Systems configuration, the
second part of the description details the components and interactions that
make up the external framework.
2 Case Study
In this section we present the case study and four example policies based
upon it. The case study is titled “Anti Guerrilla Operations” and is based
upon the example presented in the theses of Alexander, Despotu and Hall-
May [4, 5, 6] but with added detail and additional operational units to allow
exploration of a range of types of reconfiguration.
We will present the case study using the relevant MoDAF views. We give
an overview of the system using an OV1a (High-Level Operational Concept
Graphic) before moving on to describe the four scenarios under which we will
show how policies and relevant metadata can be used to maintain system
dependability with respect to their goals. It is in the four scenarios that we
shall present the required views from the system view section of MoDAF to
describe the initial / normal configuration and the changes resulting from
the execution of the policies.
The scenarios are selected to show four different aspects of system con-
figuration that can be identified and represented using the system views of
MoDAF. These aspects are:
Topology: the logical structures and potential channels of communication
formed by the components and connectors comprising the system;
Message Choreography: the number, direction and meaning of the mes-
sages exchanged between components;
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Smart Dust
Figure 1: OV1a view [3] of the Anti Guerilla Operations case study.
Port Connectivity: the protocols employed to form the logical connec-
tions, their routing along physical channels and the nature of the data
they conduct;
State: the operating state of the components in terms of the services they
provide and require.
2.1 Anti Guerrilla Operations
This case study describes a fictitious situation in which friendly coalition
forces are tasked with locating and neutralising a number of guerrilla units
operating over a large wilderness area. In Figure 1 we see the OV1a view
illustrating the units in theatre along with their basic channels of communi-
cation. The coalition forces consist of:
UAVs tasked with the initial location and classification of the hostile forces.
They provide this by flying at altitude and employing optical sensors
that stream their images back for analysis by human operators.
Smart Dust Sensors passive sensors that are deployed in the environ-
ment and assist in the locating and tracking activities. These employ
ad-hoc networking techniques to form a network to relay sensed data
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back to base. Their inclusion constitutes the main departure from the
scenario as presented in the literature.
Artillery the guerrilla units have three status classifications, active, sup-
pressed and neutralised. While active these units pose a significant
threat to coalition troops and transport, so the long range artillery
is used to suppress the guerrilla such that follow-up operations may
proceed with lower risk.
Ground Troops: these foot soldiers perform the neutralisation of sup-
pressed guerrilla units;
Transport Helicopters: these perform two main roles. The first is the
transport of the ground troops to and from suppressed guerrilla loca-
tions, avoiding locations that may contain active hostile forces. The
second is the deployment of the smart dust units;
Theatre Command: This performs the command and control role for
these operations whilst also providing the data fusion and dissemina-
tion service.
2.1.1 Topology
Our first scenario within this case study relates to the smart dust and its
means for creating a maintaining an ad-hoc, broadcast-based mesh.
The smart dust is limited in terms of energy reserves, each unit having
only a small internal battery and a limited ability to scavenge energy from
the environment. It is therefore desirable to reduce the energy expended in
performing their tasks as this will increase the longevity of each unit. At the
same time, the units themselves are relatively cheap, the major value being
held in the data they sense, so it is also desirable to replicate and disseminate
this data to increase data survivability and the confidence that it will reach
the home base.
In the scenario we assume there are high level objectives to balance
out these conflicting interests of power consumption versus data replication.
These are:
• each smart dust unit should connect to three other units;
• network islands should not be formed.
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Figure 2: An SV10c view of the messages broadcast from each smartdust
unit.
The general model for the communications supporting this policy is that
each unit broadcasts two messages every 15 minutes, a “heartbeat” message
followed by the “sensed data message”. The latter message contains all
data sensed by this smart dust unit along with any new data received from
neighbouring units. This can be seen on the SV10c1 event trace in Figure
2. The sensed data message carries all the data sensed by this unit and also
the data received from other neighbouring units, and is therefore the value-
carrying message. However it is the heartbeat that carries the metadata
about each unit and allows the network to adapt.
Initially, when the smart dust is first deployed, it has no knowledge of
the identity of or required power to reach its neighbouring units. Its first act
is to transmit a heartbeat message using the maximum transmission power
available. It then waits to receive the heartbeat messages of its neighbours.
The heartbeat messages contain the data presented in the following fragment
of an SV62 view:
ID: the ID of the unit sending the heartbeat
Hops home: shortest number of hops home via this unit, this is given a
null value if no connection to home has yet propogated through the
network
1SV10c: Resource Event-Trace Description. This shows a message choreography that
will take place to achieve some goal [3].
2SV6 is the Systems Data Exchange Matrix which characterises the data exchange
between systems [3].
6
Connected to: ID: ID of each unit which this unit believes is receiving
its transmissions
Hops home: shortest number of hops home via each unit, where
“home” in this scenario is the theatre command
Heard from: ID: ID of each unit whose heartbeat was received
Signal quality: the signal quality of each heartbeat received
‘Hops home’ above refers to the minimum number of smart dust units
a data item must traverse to reach from from any given unit. This data is
included in the hearbeat messages and so propagates through the network.
A new smart dust unit can derive its ‘hops home’ by adding one to the lowest
hops home of its nearby neighbours. When the smart dust is first introduced
into an area then individual units must determine if they are to adopt the
home hop role to provide a service to their neighbours. Means for doing this
are mentioned later in Section 2.1.3.
For the purposes of this policy, whenever a unit receives a heartbeat
message it extracts the metadata regarding the ID of the sending unit, the
set of IDs it is connected to and the signal quality relating to itself. At the
same time it logs the quality of the signal received against the ID of the
sending unit. Over the next 15 minutes it will receive heartbeats from all
active neighbouring units and builds a picture of which units are around, the
signal quality it received from them and the signal quality they received from
it using a function to classify each according to the following scale.
ConnSat: the signal strength used for this unit’s last messages was suffi-
cient for successful transmission of the following data message
ConnSat+: the signal strength of this unit’s last messages exceeded that
required for successful delivery
ConnSat-: This classification is used to indicate that the signal power used
by a unit was insufficient. It is applied to any unit where the heartbeat
message, which carries extra redundancy, is received successfully while
the data message is not.
Thus a smartdust unit builds up two pictures of its neighbouring units.
The first is a table of other unit IDs along with the quality of signal they are
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sending. The second is a table of other unit IDs and the classification they
apply to the messages this unit is sending.
The following policy is concerned with the second table as its purpose is to
adjust the transmission power employed so this unit’s messages are received
by the required number of units while reducing energy wastage. The first
table is maintained so its data can be included in the heartbeat messages sent
to allow the other units to execute their own policies regarding transmission
power.
This policy is in the form of a Teleo-reactive(T-R) program[7]. A T-R
program is an ordered list of condition-action pairs, where the conditions start
at the ideal state and get progressively worse as one moves down the list. A
T-R program is executed by evaluating each condition in turn and executing
the action of the first conditionthat evaluates to true. The action associated
with each condition should be designed such that it will help improve the
state of the system, so a well designed T-R program will eventually cause
the system to reach the goal condition if that is possible.
In this case our goal condition on the first line is that we have three or
more satisfactory outgoing connections to other units in the neighbourhood.
At the same time there are no connections that are beyond satisfactory. The
result is that we make no alteration to the transmission power at this point.
This is signified by the nil action.
ConnSat ≥ 3 ∧ ConnSat+ = 0 −→ nil
The next group of policy rules consider increasingly severe cases where
the set of connections is better than needed. While this is a positive in
terms of data survivability, it is a negative in terms of the longevity of this
unit as we are expending more energy than required. The outcome of both
of these rules is to reduce the transmission power utilised. The magnitude
of correction is greater in the second rule than the first as the second rule
represents a system with a greater number of units receiving excess signal
strength. When the conditions of the first rule become true then the system
8
is approaching the goal condition described above, so the magnitude of the
change reduces too decrease the risk of going to far3.
ConnSat > 3 ∧ 0 < ConnSat+ < 3 −→ reducePower(2%)
ConnSat+ > 3 −→ reducePower(5%)
The next group of policy rules sees the system in a worse condition, where
this unit is not connecting to the required three other units successfully. In
these conditions the required action is to increase the transmission power in
an attempt to reach the state where three others are receiving data reliably.
Again we see that, as the condition gets worse by having fewer satisfactory
connections, the size of the correction step increases.
ConnSat = 2 ∧ ConnSat− > 0 −→ increasePower(2%)
ConnSat = 1 ∧ ConnSat− > 0 −→ increasePower(5%)
ConnSat− > 0 −→ increasePower(10%)
The final rules in the policy consider the situation where the unit is not
receiving any heartbeats indicating that it is connecting to any other units.
Here the action is to increase the transmission power by greater steps than
the previous rules. These are also the rules that would be actioned when the
smart dust is first deployed and has not yet connected to any other units.
ConnResponses = 0 ∧ TXPower < 20% −→ setPower(20%)
ConnResponses = 0 ∧ TXPower < 40% −→ setPower(40%)
ConnResponses = 0 ∧ TXPower < 60% −→ setPower(60%)
ConnResponses = 0 ∧ TXPower < 80% −→ setPower(80%)
ConnResponses = 0 −→ setPower(100%)
3The values presented in this work are illustrative and not based upon any optimisation
techniques.
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2.1.2 Message choreography
For the purposes of this example we assume that the smart dust units are
able to process the data they sense from their environment. One outcome
of processing the data is that they are able to classify it on a relevant scale.
Here we suggest that an acoustic / seismic sensor may be able to classify its
sensed data as follows:
Normal priority: small troop movements, light vehicles
Urgent: large troop movements, heavy vehicles / armour
From the smart dust network’s point of view, this classification metadata
serves two purposes. Firstly it is used to determine which data to filter out
when a unit receives more data than it is able to store. Secondly it determines
the time within which the data should be delivered to the home base, which
in the case of urgent data is 1200 seconds from the time of sensing. Recall
that metadata indicating the number of network hops a unit is from home
base is included in the heartbeat message. This could be used to estimate a
worst case delivery time by considering the number of hops this unit is from
the home base, the time till it sends its next scheduled message and the time
the data was sensed. If the result is that the message could be delivered
late under these conditions then the unit has to send a special urgent data
message immediately to reduce this risk. This extra message is shown in the
the SV10c view in Figure 3.
The policy that handles this and performs other actions related to the
sending and receiving of messages is shown below. This policy is in the form
of a Policy Description Language (PDL)[2] policy. These have a different
structure to the T-R program used in the previous scenario. A PDL policy
is a set of rules where each rule has the structure
trigger causes action if condition
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So rather than evaluating the rules in order as in T-R, here the conditions
for a rule are evaluated when its trigger occurs. The triggers are not limited
to single events, but can include multiple events and traces of events that
have occurred over time. We present an example of this below.
The first group of rules in this policy concerns the initialisation and nor-
mal message passing as seen in Figure 2 in the previous scenario. When the
unit is activated an Initialise event is raised. This has the effect of starting
the 15 minute message timer and sending the first heartbeat message. The
second rule listens for the TimerPing event raised when the timer reaches
its target, it resets the timer for the next transmission, sends the heartbeat
message and raises a heartBeatSent event to trigger the transmission of data
by the next rule.
The final two rules govern the unit while it is sleeping, the first causes
the transmit timer to reset without attempting to send a message while the
second causes the unit to wake up from the sleep state when the sleep timer
ends. While in the sleep state a unit continues to record sensed data but
makes no attempt to transmit that data.
Initialise causes startT imer(900), sendHeartBeat if true
heartBeatSent causes sendData if data > 0
TimerP ing causes resetT imer(900) if Sleeping
SleepT imerP ing causes wakeUp if Sleeping
T imerP ing
causes resetT imer(900), sendHeartBeat, raise(heartBeatSent)
if notSleeping
There are two rules governing behaviour when receiving, or not receiving,
a heartbeat message. The first triggers when a heartbeat is received and
causes the unit to revert from a sleeping state if it is there, log the heartbeat
data and execute the policy described previously, which controls transmission
power. The second rule illustrates the history observing behaviour possible
with PDL. Here we assume that an event noHeartBeat is raised if there are
no heartbeat messages received within any one epoch. An epoch in this
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example is equal to the 900s timer cycle. This rule is triggered if there are
three consecutive epochs in which the noHeartBeat event is raised and also
the unit does not have sufficient power to transmit messages back to theatre
command. The action, assuming the unit is not already sleeping, is to cause
the unit to conserve power by sleeping for 1 hour, after which the unit will no
longer consider itself sleeping and will resume trying to communicate with
any neighbours.
receiveHeartBeat causes wakeUp, logData, adjustPower if true
(noHeartBeat, noHeartBeat, noHeartBeat)
causes sleepT imer(3600) if notSleeping
∧ canNotConnectHome
Two rules govern the behaviour when data is sensed from the environment
and has been classified. The first triggers when normal priority data is sensed
and causes the unit to log the data. The second triggers when urgent data
is sensed and will trigger the sending of an urgent data message if the worst
case time to home exceeds the 1200s limit. The effect of this change in the
message choreography is to insert this urgent data message into the message
exchange pattern and then to resume the wait for the timer for the normal
exchange to take place. This change can be seen in the SV10c in Figure 3.
SenseNormal causes storeData if true
SenseUrgent causes sendUrgentNow if timeToHome > 1200s
Finally there are two rules governing the behaviour of a unit when it
receives data. The first is triggered by the receipt of data and simply logs all
data in memory for relay onto the next nodes in the network. The second is
triggered by the dataLogged event and causes the unit to raise a SenseUrgent
event to allow the urgent data to be sent immediately if it may exceed its
deadline.
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Figure 3: SV10c view showing that an urgent data message may be inserted
at any point in the normal message trace of a unit, but then the normal
sequence will continue afterwards.
receiveData causes logData, raise(dataLogged) if true
dataLogged causes raise(SenseUrgent) if dataContains(Urgent)
2.1.3 Unit state
In this scenario we consider a policy that focuses on the state of a unit and
the services it offers to its neighbours.
The smart dust units are not only limited by battery life but also in their
data storage capacity. This means that it is possible for a unit to receive
more data than it is able to store, in which case it must be selective about
what to keep and what to discard. While it will base this decision on the
priority metadata associated with each sensor event and so retain the most
valuable data, it would still be desirable to maximise the coverage of data
returned to home base so it includes the normal priority content as well.
Another property of this smart dust network is that, while it may be
possible for a piece of data to traverse the nodes from an extreme edge to
the home base, this may be at the expense of the latency of the system. For
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example, at worst case, a normal priority data item traversing over eight
hops could take two hours to reach home base.
Both of the considerations suggest it is desirable to have some units enter a
“home hop” state where it utilises a built-in higher power transmitter to relay
its data messages directly to the home base rather than to its neighbours. In
doing so it will also relay any data received from its neighbours as well.
There is however a cost to entering this state in terms of the energy
expended in each transmission back to base where this cost is potentially
significantly higher than the normal local data message used in the “local
hop” state. The exact value is dependant on the amount of data transmitted
and the distance from base4. This higher transmission cost then has a nega-
tive impact on that units longevity. This cost must be traded off against the
network latency and potential for low priority sensor data being lost.
The principle behind the policy itself is that each unit is reluctant to
offer a home hop service to its neighbours, but that reluctance diminishes
as the hop count between itself and the base (or another home hope node)
increases. If we assume that the smart dust is able to determine the energy
cost to transmit a message to the home base, using a mechanism similar to
the heartbeat power adjustment described earlier, then it will also be able
to estimate its longevity if it were to adopt the home hop role. The decision
about whether a node adopts this role can be seen as a relation between the
number of hops to home base and the longevity of the node if it did. An
example of such a relation, which constitutes the belief structure[8] for this
trade off, can be seen in Figure 4 which represents part of the SV75 view for
this system.
The belief structure shows us that with only a single network hop to a
home hop node, the unit must have over 100 hours of potential longevity
before it will adopt the role, while with seven hops the unit will be more
inclined to adopt the role and will do so with only 14 hours potential life
span. Note that there is a cut off at eight hops as this implies a worst case
latency of two hours, so a node will adopt the home hop role if it experiences
a nine hop, or more, route to base.
The policy takes the form of a PDL program. We start by raising an
4The cost for transmitting home is first estimated by comparing the home base’s loca-
tion (broadcast) and the smart dust’s location (gps receiver). The actual cost is determined
when needed by the transmission of a small number of test signals to establish the actual
power required for an acceptable transmission.
5SV7 is the resource performance parameters matrix
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Figure 4: A graph illustrating the regions in which smart dust should and
should not adopt the home hop state.
event to trigger the assessment of whether a node should adopt the home hop
role. We wish to make this assessment whenever we receive a new heartbeat
message, as this may update our shortest route to base, and also on the
TimerPing event as this preempts transmission of data and the unit may
need to reassess if it can afford the energy to send a message home.
receiveHeartBeat causes raise(checkState) if true
T imerP ing causes raise(checkState) if true
The third rule in the policy is triggered by the checkState event generated
above. It defines the conditions, as a series of points on the belief structure,
above which this node will make the change to be a home hop node by
following the switchToHomeHop transition. This transition can be found on
the SV10b6 view of the system in Figure 5. This rule also contains the cutoff
clause where, when facing more than 8 hops to base the unit will make the
transition regardless of the effect on longevity.
6SV10b is the Resource state transition description of the system.
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Figure 5: SV10b showing the top level states a smart dust unit may adopt
and the transitions between them.
checkState causes switchToHomeHop
if longevityHomeHop > 100 ∧ hopsHome = 1
∨ longevityHomeHop > 62 ∧ hopsHome = 2
∨ longevityHomeHop > 44 ∧ hopsHome = 3
∨ longevityHomeHop > 30 ∧ hopsHome = 4
∨ longevityHomeHop > 21 ∧ hopsHome = 5
∨ longevityHomeHop > 17 ∧ hopsHome = 6
∨ longevityHomeHop > 14 ∧ hopsHome = 7
∨ longevityHomeHop > 12 ∧ hopsHome = 8
∨hopsHome > 8
The final rule performs the reverse function of the above, allowing the unit to
resign from the home hop role when its longevity drops below desired levels.
checkState causes switchToLocalHop
if longevityHomeHop 6 100 ∧ hopsHome = 1
∨ longevityHomeHop 6 62 ∧ hopsHome = 2
∨ longevityHomeHop 6 44 ∧ hopsHome = 3
∨ longevityHomeHop 6 30 ∧ hopsHome = 4
∨ longevityHomeHop 6 21 ∧ hopsHome = 5
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∨ longevityHomeHop 6 17 ∧ hopsHome = 6
∨ longevityHomeHop 6 14 ∧ hopsHome = 7
∨ longevityHomeHop 6 12 ∧ hopsHome = 8
2.1.4 Port Connectivity
The final scenario presented in this report moves away from the smart dust and
considers the connection between the UAVs providing a video reconnaissance ser-
vice and the theatre command where analysis by human operators takes place.
In the scenario the UAVs stream their video back to theatre command via
a fixed power radio link. A result of this is that while operating over the close
half of the battlespace the video link is sufficient for the video stream, however
as the operating range increases beyond this the signal-to-noise ratio falls and
the video protocol experiences an increasing number of failures. These failures
manifest themselves as dropped frames of video, which is considered something to
be minimised, so in the scenario the goal of no more than 5 dropped frames per
minute is advocated.
The parameters of the connection used to stream the video can be adjusted to
compensate for this increased error rate by introducing additional error correction
data. However this reduces the effective bandwidth of the connector which has
to be paid for by either reducing the frame rate or the resolution of the images
streamed in the video. For this scenario we assume that a high-level policy has
been defined telling us that when reducing the over all quality of the video, we value
resolution higher than frame rate, so frame rate should be reduced to a minimum
before altering resolution. For the purposes of the example, video resolution can
be set to four values, {veryHigh, High, Medium and Low}. The details of the
connector parameters chosen at any point in time would be visible in a SV2b view
of the system, as can be seen in Figure 6.
The policy guiding the selection of the video streaming parameters is presented
below and starts with the ideal condition where we meet the frame drop budget
at the highest quality of video, here the policy performs no action.
FramesDropMin 6 5 ∧PicQual = veryHigh ∧FPS = 30 −→ nil
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video recon
Figure 6: SV2b showing the connection details between a UAV and the
theatre command for a strong connection.
The second group of rules are concerned with increasing the video quality again
when the signal quality increases and can support it. It first increases the video
resolution and then the frame rate.
FramesDropMin < 2 ∧ PicQual = veryHigh ∧ FPS < 30 −→ increaseFPS(2)
FramesDropMin < 2∧PicQual < veryHigh∧FPS = 10 −→ increaseP icQual
FramesDropMin < 2∧FPS < 10 −→ increaseFPS(100%)
The final group of rules capture the situations where the signal is failing to
meet the needs of the video and so the recorded error rate suggests that we will
not meet the frame drop budget. These rules initially reduce the frame rate in 2
FPS steps, until it reaches the lower limit of 10 FPS, at which point it switches
to reducing the resolution in known steps, this configuration is shown in Figure
7. The final catch-all rule in this group captures the situations where 10 FPS and
low video resolution are still too much for the signal and so when fired it reduces
the frame rate by half each time.
FramesDropMin > 5∧PicQual = veryHigh∧FPS > 10 −→ reduceFPS(2)
FramesDropMin > 5∧PicQual > Low∧FPS = 10 −→ reduceP icQual
FramesDropMin > 5∧PicQual = Low −→ reduceFPS(50%)
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Figure 7: SV2b showing the connection details between a UAV and the
theatre command for a weak connection.
3 Policies
The literature provides us with some interesting properties we should consider
when researching policy languages and the system that support them. We will
start by presenting the properties one might seek in a language first and then move
on to the properties of the support systems. Where possible we will illustrate the
properties with examples based on the case study.
3.1 Language Considerations
In this section we present five properties from the literature [9] that it is desirable
for a language to possess. Languages that support policy refinement and analysis
will assist with construction of policy that is correct with respect to the specifi-
cation and consistent, while the syntactic support for grouping, inheritance and
parametrisation will help manage the complexity of the policy.
3.1.1 Refinement
In more than one of the scenarios in the previous section there were high-level goals
such as “the smart dust must connect to at least three others”, or a description
of the decision process for when to change operating state to offer the home hop
service. These goals, while easy to read, are not actually executable and need
refining into decidable rules with specific actions.
The concern facing the policy designer is how to show that the refined policy
resulting from analysis of the high level goals is a correct implementation of those
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goals. For this we need a definition of correct refinement in the context of policies
and goals, Damianou et. al [9], propose the following statement as defining a correct
refinement.
Correctness: A refined policy Pr is said to be correct to a specification Ps if
there is a subset of Pr such that this subset behaves identically to Ps.
Damianou et. al also propose the following two additional properties as being
desirable in a refined policy.
Consistency: The above would allow a subset of Pr to behave identically to
Ps and therefore be correct, but would allow Pr to contain another rule
that counteracts the rules in the subset. In this case we have a policy
that is inconsistent. To be consistent a policy must not contain any such
counteracting rules.
Minimal: A policy is said to be minimal if the removal of any policy rules breaks
the correctness defined above. If a policy is both correct and consistent but
it not minimal then it must contain redundancy and so may waste resources
assessing extra rules or be potentially more subject to errors introduced
during maintenance.
3.1.2 Analysis
The policies presented in the examples were intentionally kept simple in order to
aid understanding, and could easily have been expanded to give potentially more
realistic behaviour.
As the policy grows, manual inspection of the rules will become more difficult
and costly, so a language that supports automated analysis would be a benefit.
Examples of the analysis one might consider include:
Authorisation Conflicts: in policies focusing on, for example, access control,
is it possible to define rules that act upon the same subject, target and
action7 but where one rules allows the action where another rule prohibits
it under the same conditions.
Obligation Conflicts: if there exists a policy that obliges a subject to perform
some action while another policy prohibits that subject from performing
that action.
7The subject is the entity that is requesting an action, target refers to the entity the
action would be performed on and action is the thing the subject wants to do. E.g. user A
wants to delete file x.
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Unauthorised Obligation Conflicts: if there exist policies that oblige a sub-
ject to perform the action while another policy denies the subject the au-
thority to do it.
The above could be determined by syntactic analysis of the policy rules for
a system. However, there can be application conflicts arising from application
specific constraints. These can only be detected automatically if such constraints
are encoded in a manner that allows them to be interpreted and the policy checked.
An example based upon the case study would be a separation of concerns issue.
Here we might see that a policy allows an entity to identify and designate targets
for an artillery fire mission, while there is another policy rule granting that entity
permission to authorise the fire mission. This might remove some checks and
measures in place to ensure safety of the system in this respect.
3.1.3 Grouping, Inheritance and Parameterisation
The final three language properties one might consider are their support for group-
ing, inheritance and parametrisation.
Grouping is the facility to define a group name and then use that name instead
of instance names when defining policy rules. Individual entities in the system may
then be assigned to that group and by extension become bound or empowered by
the rules in which that group is a named subject. An example related to the
case study would be a group called UAVs to which all the UAVs assigned to this
mission are members. A second group could be Artillery to which all the available
artillery units are assigned. These group names can then be used to define access
control rules, for example:
centralDataReadRequest causes allow if unitIn(Artillery, Command, ...)
centralDataWriteRequest causes allow if unitIn(Artillery, UAV s,Command, ...)
The mission group, consisting of all units in the case study, may all be subject
to a common policy that contains all the rules we have so far described but may
also inherit theatre specific policies. Such policies may describe the local chain of
command, weapons release rules by geographic location, allowances for using civil-
ian or hostile networks for communications etc. These may also describe default
access control policies for coalition members from other nation states. A policy
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language that allowed the group definition to explicitly inherit from the theatre
policy would be a benefit here.
Parameterisation of policy template may also offer benefits in this situation.
For example, if the mission group policy has a parametrised definition then it may
be possible to pass in data such as the hierarchy of management for the system
configuration, the groups included with their group specific policies and the radio
channel numbers to use.
3.2 Policy System Considerations
Moving on to consider the systems that support and evaluate the policies, we
find four key points from the literature[10]. These are rule evaluation initiation,
metadata gathering time, metadata statefulness and effector statefulness.
3.2.1 Rule Evaluation
Rule evaluation initiation refers to the mechanism used to guide the rule evaluator
to the required rule. There are essentially two mechanisms, solicited evaluation
and unsolicited evaluation.
In the solicited model, which could also be called event-based, when a trigger
event associated with a rule is observed, the conditions associated with that rule
are evaluated and if true the action performed. The two PDL policies described in
the message choreography and unit state scenarios (Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3) both
use this model as PDL is a trigger, condition, action language.
In the unsolicited model rule evaluation is continuous. The two T-R policies
in the topology and port connectivity scenarios (Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.4) exhibit
this model where some property of the system is continuously being tested. In the
case of T-R programs only one rule may be tested at any time and the order of
testing is strictly from top to bottom on the list so as to respect the order which
represents the preference structure.
3.2.2 Metadata Gathering
Metadata gathering regards the timing of when the value of an item of metadata
is recorded for use by a policy. There are two models here, lazy evaluation and
pre-computed.
In the lazy model metadata would be gathered only when needed to support
the evaluation of a rule, while in the pre-computed model it will be gathered
according to some schedule.
In the scenarios the data used in the topology scenario policy could be con-
sidered pre-computed as it recorded when the neighbouring heartbeat messages
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are received and then simply looked up when needed. The message choreography
scenario contains at least one piece of lazily evaluated metadata, in that an assess-
ment of whether the data has been received from another node is only performed
when needed.
3.2.3 Metadata Statefulness
Metadata statefulness simply refers to the support for acting based upon the his-
tory of a particular metadata or whether only the latest value is considered. For
example in the UAV port connectivity scenario, the rate at which frames of video
are being dropped has to be based upon stateful data as the current frame can
only inform as to the number of transport failures it contains. At the same time
the same scenario makes use of stateless metadata, for example the current fram-
erate of the video stream is used to determine what the next framerate will be if
a change is required.
3.2.4 Effector Statefulness
Effector statefulness is the final property in this section. It refers to the support
or requirement for multiple dependent actions to be triggered by a rule. If it is
required then the dependence can be in terms of the order of execution or the
requirement to pass the results of one action onto the next. For example in the
message choreography scenario the heartbeat signal must be complete before the
data message is sent. While an example of the results being passed would be an
action that searches for a suitable alternate component when an existing one fails,
the ID of this new component would then be passed to an action to connect it. It
could also be that all the actions of a rule must complete before evaluation may
take place again.
If the effectors are stateless then they become essentially asynchronous func-
tions that are initiated but then not explicitly checked for completion by the rule
that invoked them. If there is more than one action initiated as the result of a
policy rule then these actions are independent of each other with no results shared
and potentially completing at separate times.
4 Configuration Management Framework
In Section 2 we presented some case studies where policies and metadata can be
used to govern aspects of the configuration. In this section we will present early
views of the reconfiguration framework that may enable a policy based approach
to configuration management in a System of Systems. While this framework will
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be developed using the case studies in the earlier section, we should stress that
the two are not yet closely linked. Specifically, the policies in the previous section
were built to indicate the intended behaviour of the system and also to illustrate
the differences between the two approaches. These polices do not yet map onto
the structure envisaged for the framework where the goals of the system and the
concrete actions taken to achieve those goals will be separated in an effort to
facilitate policy reuse across platforms.
4.1 Framework Context
We envisage there being an instance of the a configuration management framework
existing in each significant unit in the battlespace. The framework can be separated
into two parts: the external framework is concerned with the gross configuration of
units in the battlespace, while the internal framework focuses on the configuration
of an individual unit.
We will start by presenting the context of the two parts of the framework,
showing their relationships to the main entities with which they interact. The
detail of the external portion of this framework will be presented following this.
As can be seen in the OV28 depicted in Figure 8, the framework has a number
of input and output channels where it shares data with the mission group, its unit
operator and the system hardware of that unit. An outline of the data flowing
across the needlines is presented as an OV39 in Table 1.
A walkthrough the needlines at this level of the architecture is as follows:
• Firstly via needline o1, raw metadata is obtained over from the hardware
of this unit by the internal part of the reconfiguration framework. This
metadata is made available to the external framework over needline o2.
• The external framework uses this data to determine the performance of this
unit, this is made available to the mission group as a set of capabilities with
metrics via needline o4.
• The external framework also receives the capabilities from other units, need-
line o3, and combines these with its own capabilities. After consulting the
policies it contains, this may result in a set of proposed new configurations
for the system. A process of negotiation takes place with the other units via
sharing of proposed configurations on needlines o5 and o6.
8OV2: Operational Node Relationship Diagram [3].
9OV3: Operational Information Exchange Matrix [3]
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ID From To Description
o1 HW IF Raw Sensed Unit Metadata
o2 IF EF Raw Health Monitoring Metadata
o3 MG EF Capabilities of Other Components
o4 EF MG This Component Capabilities
o5 EF MG Proposed Configurations
o6 MG EF Proposed Configurations
o7 EF IF Operating State to Adopt
o8 EF HO Suggested Operating State for Human Con-
sumption
o9 HO IF Operator’s Operating State Override
o10 IF HW Hardware Configuration Details
Key
HW Unit hardware IF Internal framework
EF External framework MG Mission group
HO Human operator
Table 1: An OV3 representation of the needlines shared between the recon-
figuration framework and its neighbours.
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Hardware
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o8
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o1,o10
Figure 8: An OV2 representation of the overall framework, showing its three
constituent parts and the three main entities with which it interacts.
• When an agreement is reached on the configuration of the mission group,
the external framework informs the internal framework of this by altering
the operating state description on needline o7.
• As the human operator has tactical awareness, this operating state informa-
tion should be made available in some form via needline o8. The operator
may then override the framework’s choice by setting the unit operating state
over needline o9.
• Finally, the internal framework determines the hardware configuration re-
quired to meet the operating state set and implements the changes by send-
ing the appropriate configuration details across needline o10.
While there are no explicit needlines flowing between the architecture models
and any of the components, it is assumed that all components will have both read
and write access to these models, the needlines being hidden to reduce complexity
in the figures. This also applies to the external framework OV2 view that follows.
We shall now expand upon the above OV2 to reveal the components within
the external portion of the framework. The description centres heavily around the
external framework as this is the focus of this task, however a brief description
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of the internal portion to illustrate its potential similarity to the external portion
follows.
4.2 External Framework
The purpose of the external portion of the framework is to consider the gross
system formed by the mission group and available coalition forces in the area.
The outcome of these considerations should be a configuration of units that best
satisfies the goals of the policies and by extension the needs to the mission group
primarily and if possible also the needs of the surrounding coalition members.
This configuration is in terms of services provided by each unit, which units use
the services along with the nature and topology of the connectors between them.
We see the external framework expanded as an OV2 in Figure 9 with an outline
of the data exchanged shown in the OV3 view in Table 2.
1
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8,9
10,11
13
14 15
16
4 Group Goal
Policy
Search Policy
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Mechanisms
Group Safety
Policy
Capability
Functions
Adverts
in
Adverts
out
Raw 
metadata
Operating
State
Proposals
in
Proposals
out
Agreement
Policy
2
Figure 9: An OV2 view showing the components that make up the external
portion of the reconfiguration framework.
A walkthrough the data exchanges in the external framework follows:
• The process can start with the receipt of the health monitoring metadata
from the internal framework via needline 1. This data is processed by the
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ID From To Description
1 MD CF Raw Health Monitoring Metadata
2 AO CF This Component Capabilities
3 AI CF Capabilities of Other Components
4 CF GGP System Capability Metadata
5 GGP SP Reconfig Goal
6 SP RM Reconfig Goal and Search Parameters
7 RM SP Set of Candidate Configurations
8 SP CF Candidate Configuration
9 CF SP Candidate Configuration Prognosis
10 SP GSP Candidate Configuration and Prognosis
11 GSP SP Ok / Not OK
12 SP GGP Set of Safe Configurations and Prognosis
13 GGP AP Ordered Set of Safe Configurations and Prog-
nosis
14 AP PO Proposed Configurations
15 PI AP Proposed Configurations
16 AP OS Operating State to Adopt
Key
GGP Group goal policy CF Capability functions
SP Search policy RM Reconfiguration mecha-
nisms
GSP Group safety policy AP Agreement policy
PO Proposals out port PI Proposals in port
OS Operating state channel MD Raw unit metadata
AI Adverts in port AO Adverts out port
Table 2: An OV3 representation of the data exchanges in the external frame-
work.
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unit specific capability functions which outputs this unit’s current and pos-
sible capabilities via needline 2.
• The capability functions also read in the capabilities of the other units in the
mission groups via needline 3, and combines it with this unit’s capabilities
to form the current System of Systems capability metrics. These are passed
to the group goal policy via needline 4.
• The group goal policy compares the capability metrics with the policies
it contains, if a reconfiguration is required it passes this information as a
reconfiguration goal to the search policy along needline 5.
• The search policy takes the reconfiguration goal and adds to it parameters
relating the number of candidate alternate configurations required. This is
passed to the reconfiguration mechanisms over needline 6. The reconfigura-
tion mechanisms then, if possible, propose the required number of alternate
configurations that may address the reconfiguration goal. This set is re-
turned to the search policy along needline 7.
• The search policy then obtains prognostic metadata about each candidate
configuration by passing them along needline 8 to the capability functions.
The prognostic metadata for each candidate is returned to the search policy
along needline 9.
• To candidate configurations along with their prognostics are then passed to a
group safety policy along needline 10. This policy can veto any configuration
that does not comply with its rules, the “OK” or “Not OK” result for each
candidate being returned along needline 11.
• The search policy passes the set of safe configurations back to to the group
goal policy over needline 12. The set is then placed into a preference order
based upon the preference structure included in the group goal policy. This
ordered set is then forwarded to the agreement policy via needline 13.
• The final steps in the operation are to broadcast, via needline 14, these
new proposed configurations to the mission group members, who may also
propose their own configurations, via needline 15, in light of issues they have
encountered. Some mechanism is the employed used to form an agreement
on which configuration to adopt. This unit’s part of the new configuration
is implemented by setting the required operating state and passing this to
the internal framework over needline 16.
We will now expand on each of the components indicating its purpose and
some open questions that exist.
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4.2.1 Group Goal Policy
The first and primary policy is the “group goal policy”. This policy should contain
statements about the desired properties of the group configuration throughout the
mission and it is by using this policy that the configuration manager determines
if there is a need for a change to the group level configuration. The trigger and
conditional parts of the policies in the scenarios fall into this category, while the
actions would exist elsewhere as we shall show later. For example the topology
scenario includes rules that are triggered based upon the count of connections
associated with each smartdust unit.
The group goal policy also needs to have the policy designer’s belief structure
encoded in such a way as to allow a set of proposed configurations with prognostic
metadata to be ordered according to preference. Three techniques for determining
at least a partial order when there are multiple characteristics to consider are
discussed by Baker[8], a brief description of each is:
Weighted Additive Value Model (WAM)
In this model, each candidate solution is assessed with respect to a number of
criteria and given a score for each. The attractiveness of each solution is found
by multiplying the score for each criteria by a weighting for that criteria and then
summing the resulting values. The solution with the highest total score is then
selected.
Enumeration and Scoring (ENUM)
Like WAM this model is concerned with generating a single score by which candi-
date solutions can be compared, however unlike WAM this method is based upon
boolean statements rather than applying scores to individual critera.
In this method desired properties of the system are described as boolean state-
ments, e.g responseT ime < 25ms and error < 5%. These statements are
then placed into groups where being in a group implies that there is no preference
between the statements. The statement groups are then ordered by preference,
with the most preferred group labelled 1, the next best labelled 2 etc.
The key to this analysis is the scores associated with each statement in each
group. They are calculated such that, for example, each statement in group 1 has
a score that is greater than the sum of all statements in all groups below it. The
same then applies to each statement in group 2, that also has a score higher than
the sum of all statements in all groups below it.
A system is evaluated by adding up the total score of all statements that are
true about that system. The scoring system described above ensure that a system
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with a single statement true in group 1 will be scored more highly than a system
with any number of statements from below group 1 being true.
Lexicographic Analysis (LEX)
Lexigographic analysis requires that systems may be scored on specific criteria in
the same way as in WAM. However this method does not evaluate all criteria at the
same time, instead they are evaluated in order of importance to the decision being
made. Instead each criteria is evaluated for all systems in turn until a candidate
is found with a value that outranks all others for a criteria.
For example, if there are three criteria X1, X2 and X3 and two candidates A
and B then first X1 is evaluated for both candidates. IfX1A = X1B then the
evaluation moves onto X2. If X2A > X2B then candidate A is deemed to be
preferrable to B, regardless of the values associated with X3.
These methods each have their own advantages and disadvantages, a critique
of each can be found in [8].
4.2.2 Reconfiguration Mechanisms
While the goal policy can inform which properties are moving out of their ideal
ranges and from that propose a goal a reconfiguration should achieve, it defers the
specification of what action to take to a library of reconfiguration mechanisms.
These mechanisms are generic runtime solutions to dependability issues that may
be applied with known properties. An example of such a mechanism would be ‘re-
covery blocks’ where there are two versions of an algorithm with some mechanism
for deciding if the primary version can be used (time / value) or if the second lower
quality version should be employed. Many more examples of these may be found
in the ReSIST “Resilience-Explicit Computing Mechanisms” knowledge base 10.
In the example scenarios, for simplicity, the policies all specify concrete actions
taken to rectify the situation at hand. For example in the topology scenario the
actions in the rule directly manipulate the power output of the local hop trans-
missions. This has the effect of coupling the policy to the hardware reducing its
potential for reuse on other platforms and constraining the approach taken to a
particular situation. We suggest that by decoupling the goal rules and reconfigu-
ration mechanisms by restricting the goal rule actions to statements of intent and
then having hardware specific policies that act on the statements of intent, the
goal policies may be designed with the mission, and not the hardware, in mind.
10http://resist.ecs.soton.ac.uk/resex/
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4.2.3 Search Policy
As there are multiple mechanisms that may be applied to a situation and poten-
tially also different priorities given to different properties in the goal policy, it is
possible that there could be many candidate configurations that could be consid-
ered as a solution. To acknowledge this we include a search policy in the framework
to manage this process. The search policy needs to include statements about two
distinct aspects of the search, assessment and termination.
Assessment informs the framework about when to perform an analysis of a
potential new configuration and which analysis to invoke. The choice here would
be based upon two aspects:
• computational cost of the analysis in terms of time and computing resources
consumed;
• value and criticality of the results returned in terms of their potential influ-
ence on the final choice.
Termination of the reconfiguration process is desirable but the conditions under
which it occurs may differ between systems. In time-critical systems it could be
that termination of the search occurs after a specified interval, with the current
best configuration being adopted. A less time critical system may be willing to
wait for a more optimal solution with specified degree of improvement over the
current situation, or maybe select the best after 20 candidates have been assessed.
4.2.4 Capability Functions
The search policy assumes that we can prognostically assess a candidate archi-
tecture. To assist with this process and also acknowledge that the goals policy
may make reference to properties beyond the basic availability / reliability etc, we
include the notion of capability functions in the framework. These are functions
that are able to assess a configuration for its suitability for a particular purpose.
Being specialist functions they can make use of domain specific knowledge in their
design.
A possible capability function based on the case study could be an assessment of
the systems ability to perform the video reconnaissance function. Such a capability
could be determined based upon the operating state and health data of each unit,
giving that units ability to capture video data. This would then be combined with
an assessment of the communication channels available to transport the video
data from the source to where it is needed, resulting in some measure of the video
reconnaissance capability.
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The goal of providing support for these functions is so that group goal policies
may be written in terms of capability levels and decoupled from how the level is
determined for system.
4.2.5 Agreement
If there is a clear configuration command structure within the mission group and
all units are visible then it is possible that a single unit may take charge of the
group configuration and all subordinates will adopt its proposed configuration.
Such a system would be termed “self adaptive”[11]. However if there is no clear
structure or if the group becomes fragmented then the initial top-down self adap-
tive approach may switch to a “self organising”[11] mode, this change itself being
a type of reconfiguration. In this latter mode we need to consider the possibil-
ity that while individual units may have identical policies it is conceivable that
they have different views of the world in terms of the state of group members and
the environment. This may cause them to propose different configurations to the
group. For this reason a group agreement policy is required to determine which
configuration to adopt. A simple policy could be a fall back hierarchy, or the
allocation of bandwidth for the purpose of synchronising views.
4.2.6 Communications
By definition this external portion of the configuration manager can not work in
isolation and must have channels of communication both internally and to other
members of the coalition.
The external channels take the form of two broadcast messages, illustrated
as an SV10c in Figure 10. The first of these is a statement of capabilities both
currently offered by a unit and also capabilities it could offer after a reconfiguration.
This is to update both the mission group members about a units status in terms of
stores and services, but also to inform coalition members in the area of potential
services. The second type of broadcast is a proposal for a new configuration.
This includes the operating state components should adopt (SV10b), the port
connectivity between them (SV2b) mapping of logical connections onto physical
pathways (SV2c) and expected message passing behaviour (SV10c). Each unit
will emit similar broadcast messages to inform about their status and suggested
configurations. There may be many iterations of simply exchanging the current
capabilities of each unit before a need to reconfigure is detected. At that point
there will be an exchange of proposed configurations between the unit and the
mission group to determine the new configuration to adopt.
There are two communication channels linking the external portion to the
internal portion of the framework. The first of these is the “operating state”
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Figure 10: The interactions between any particular unit in the mission group
and the remainder of the group.
channel, this carries a description of the functions the unit should be providing and
any metadata required to configure them. For example, in the topology scenario,
the concrete power setting output would be passed from the external portion that
requires it, to the internal portion that implements it, along this channel. A further
example would be when a UAV reaches the location where video reconnaissance is
to begin. The goal policy would then require that the video streaming capability
be active. An operating state transition indicating this would be passed to the
internal configuration manager that would then be responsible for implementing
the internal changes required.
It should be noted that the operating state channel named above is the same
channel used by the units human operator(s) via their instrument and control pan-
els. The human operators are expected to have the final say on the operating state
of the unit and as such can override the external reconfiguration policy choices.
The second channel provides the health monitoring metadata required by the
goal policies and capability functions.
4.2.7 Group Safety
Additional to the policies for exploring and primary selection of the configuration
there also exists a group safety policy. Similar in nature to the policies described in
Hall-May [6], this policy describes immutable conditions that the group condition
is not allowed to adopt and as such it provides an internal veto to any configuration
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before it is proposed to the group.
4.3 Internal Framework
In this work we treat the internal reconfiguration framework as a black box as it is
outside of our scope. It is worth noting however that while approaches to internal
reconfiguration exist, most notably using the concept of software blueprints [12,
13], it may also be possible to take a policy approach and structure similar to that
described above. For example, the group goal policy from the external framework
would be replaced by a unit goal policy in the internal version. This unit goal policy
would then contain rules defining the dependability goals specific to the unit in
which it exists, and these would most likely be tied to the allowed operating states
of that system. The remaining components in the external framework would also
have their counterparts in the internal framework. The exception to this is the
agreement policy as there would not be a need to negotiate with the other group
members to determine the internal details of this unit, the configuration being
determined by the values in the operating state channel alone.
5 Conclusions
In this report we have shown a number of aspects of our ongoing work. This results
in the conclusions we present here taking the form of current research questions
rather than final statements of recommendations. We divide the conclusions into
subsections on the Case Study, Policies and Framework.
5.1 Case Study
There was an even split between the scenarios we tackled using the T-R program
approach and those where we utilised a PDL policy. In both these cases the
decision was made after discussion of the problem to be solved, and it appeared
that the choice of which to use was clear. The general rule at this point is that if
the policy conditions require continuous monitoring then a T-R program may suit,
while if a policy rule should only be considered when a detectable event occurs
then a PDL approach may be better. An open question is, when is it appropriate
to use each of the two approaches and whether there are “grey areas” where either
could be suitable, or (less desirable), neither is suitable.
We found that the changes we were considering were visible in a limited number
of MoDAF views. Specifically, we used SV2b to represent changes in connectivity
/ topology, SV10c to represent changes in choreography and SV10b to provide
place names for a token to represent the current state of a unit.
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We also expect that SV2c would be a locus of reconfiguration. If we consider
the UAV to theatre command video connection in the earlier scenario, the band-
width degrades because of the distance between the two units. If in that scenario
a friendly unit appears mid way between the two, then it may act as a relay, ef-
fectively increasing the signal strength and the available bandwidth. This change
would be seen on an SV2c as it constitutes a change mapping between the logical
connection between the units and the physical path it adopts.
We have yet to find a scenario where run time reconfigurations are made that
require changes in the other views within the system view set. We will continue
to produce scenarios within this case study to validate or extend this set.
The definition of which views are dynamic and within policy control is impor-
tant to us as we have considered scenarios where, for example, the best solution to
the problem is to alter the flight path of the UAV. Such a change is not visible on
any MoDAF view. We consider that if this course of action was determined to be
the most appropriate according to the policy then the only action the policy may
perform is to raise an alert with a specific human operator role. The reason for
this is that the operator will have a tactical awareness that is not available to the
policy and so can make the decision about whether to follow this suggested course
of action or not.
5.2 Policies and Framework
We presented a set of desirable properties of policy languages and the systems
that support them. In the scenarios we have used two languages, T-R and PDL.
These languages were used at this stage as we have some familiarity with them
and because they represent two distinct types of language. We have not assessed,
however, to what degree they meet the desirable properties presented or if they
have the tool support to assist with analysis and processing. It follows then that
the question of which policy language or languages will be used in the final demon-
stration is still open.
The final section of the report gives an overview of the reconfiguration frame-
work in which an outline of its behaviour was presented. At this stage there are a
few open questions that have yet to be answered, a selection of which we recount
now.
The group goal policy has two important roles to perform, firstly to determine if
a reconfiguration is required according to the policy it holds and secondly to order
the resulting set of potential configurations according to preference. In this case
we have an obligation to ensure that that preferences implicit in the policy actions
are consistent with the preference structure used to order the set of candidate
architectures. There appear to be two approaches to increasing confidence in this
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issue. The first is to utilise some tool support to produce both their policy rules
and preference structure from the same source data, the second is to consider
annotating the policy rules in such a way that the preferences become explicit and
the structure can be derived from them at run time.
The framework also includes a number of user definable elements, including
the goal policy above, the search policy, the agreement policy and the capability
functions. The question here is, in what form should the policies be presented to
the framework and also what interfaces would be required to service the capability
functions.
The final point worthy of mention within the scope of our task is the represen-
tation of the architectural models of both the current system and the candidate
configurations that are generated. To answer this will require considering the
prevalent architecture description languages and UML representations. These will
be examined in terms of their support for the views we require and the operations
we would need to perform for analysis and reconfiguration.
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8 List of Abbreviations
ENUM: Enumeration and Scoring Method[8]
FPS: Frames Per Second
GPS: Global Positioning System
LEX: Lexicographical Sorting Method[8]
MoDAF: Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework
NEC: Network Enabled Capability
PDL: Policy Description Language (Actual language name, not a reference to
the class of languages)
SIG: Special Interest Group
T-R: Teleo-Reactive
UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UML: Unified Modelling Language
WAM: Weighted Additive Value Model[8]
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